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Abstract
Background: All influenza pandemic plans advocate pandemic vaccination. However, few studies have evaluated the cost-
effectiveness of different vaccination strategies. This paper compares the economic outcomes of vaccination compared with
treatment with antiviral agents alone, in Singapore.
Methodology: We analyzed the economic outcomes of pandemic vaccination (immediate vaccination and vaccine
stockpiling) compared with treatment-only in Singapore using a decision-based model to perform cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analyses. We also explored the annual insurance premium (willingness to pay) depending on the perceived
risk of the next pandemic occurring.
Principal Findings: The treatment-only strategy resulted in 690 deaths, 13,950 hospitalization days, and economic cost of
USD$497 million. For immediate vaccination, at vaccine effectiveness of .55%, vaccination was cost-beneficial over
treatment-only. Vaccine stockpiling is not cost-effective in most scenarios even with 100% vaccine effectiveness. The annual
insurance premium was highest with immediate vaccination, and was lower with increased duration to the next pandemic.
The premium was also higher with higher vaccine effectiveness, attack rates, and case-fatality rates. Stockpiling with case-
fatality rates of 0.4–0.6% would be cost-beneficial if vaccine effectiveness was .80%; while at case-fatality of .5%
stockpiling would be cost-beneficial even if vaccine effectiveness was 20%. High-risk sub-groups warrant higher premiums
than low-risk sub-groups.
Conclusions: The actual pandemic vaccine effectiveness and lead time is unknown. Vaccine strategy should be based on
perception of severity. Immediate vaccination is most cost-effective, but requires vaccines to be available when required.
Vaccine stockpiling as insurance against worst-case scenarios is also cost-effective. Research and development is therefore
critical to develop and stockpile cheap, readily available effective vaccines.
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Introduction
The influenza A (H1N1-2009) pandemic has been declared a
pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) which has
led to the activation of pandemic plans worldwide. These include
development of candidate pandemic vaccines and stockpiling on
antiviral drugs. However, it is not possible to predict with certainty
when and what strain will trigger the next influenza pandemic.
The influenza virus’s changing behavior, acquisition of adaptive
mutations, expansion of host range, emerging transmissibility of
different strains among humans, and potential for genetic re-
assortment raise concerns [1] even in the early stages of an
apparently mild pandemic.
In recent years, H5N1 vaccines have been touted as a possible
pandemic vaccination strategy to protect against a potential H5N1
pandemic strain [2,3]. Following successful clinical trials, such
vaccines are currently available and some countries have begun
stockpiling them. Many countries are also developing prototype
vaccines against the H1N1-2009 strain. Although these vaccines
provide a critical element of pandemic preparedness for policy
makers, the cost-effectiveness of such a strategy is unknown. In
addition,the pandemic may not be caused by current strains and the
vaccinemaynotbetotallyeffective.Policymakerswillthereforehave
to consider the cost-effectiveness of deploying a vaccination strategy
in anticipation of a pandemic; due to the substantial investment in
research and development, and manufacturing of vaccines.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 9 | e7108While several reports have compared the cost-effectiveness of
vaccination [4], or treatment and/or prophylaxis with antiviral
drugs [5,6] during a pandemic, few studies have evaluated the cost-
effectiveness of pandemic vaccination strategies. This paper provides
a comparison on the economic outcomes of vaccination and
stockpiles of vaccines against treatment with antiviral agents only,
in Singapore. Singapore is a modern city-state with a well-connected
global travel network such that influenza can readily spread to
Singapore from anywhere in the world within a short period. Our
findings provide a framework of optimal strategies and consider-
ations for national policy makers to plan for a future pandemic.
Methods
Similar to a previous anti-viral study performed in Singapore
[5], this study used a decision-analysis model (Figure 1) to perform
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness assessments for pandemic
vaccination in Singapore. The model compared the current
pandemic management strategy of early oseltamivir treatment and
supportive management (treatment only) against pandemic
vaccination in addition to early treatment (vaccination).
Cost-benefit analyses were performed to compare different
vaccination strategies with treatment only, and included appro-
priate direct and indirect economic costs such as the cost of death.
Cost-effectiveness analyses were also performed based on cost per-
life-saved by vaccination and treatment only to provide another
analytical dimension which avoids quantifying the value of life.
The annual insurance premium was also used because it is difficult
to predict a vaccine’s true value. The annual insurance premium
was the maximum cost that the country would be willing to pay
annually to avert the impact of a pandemic, and includes all costs
associated with vaccination including research and development,
purchase, additional stockpiles, administration, and adverse
effects. For example, a country would be willing to pay 3 times
the annual insurance premium for a vaccine with 3 years shelf-life
including administration, warehousing, and other costs. The
analyses also provide the optimal strategies and investments for
vaccines depending on vaccine efficacy and other key parameters.
Input variables
The values for all parameters are shown in Table 1. The clinical
variables are initially centered on a pandemic similar to the 1957
or 1968 pandemic, rather than the much more severe 1918
pandemic which will tend to favor additional intervention. The
study was conducted based on Singapore’s 2007 mid-year local
population [7], divided into 3 age groups, each consisting of 2 risk
groups [5].
Since several countries, including Singapore, have stockpiled
oseltamivir as part of the preparedness for an influenza pandemic,
we assumed that antiviral treatment is available for every resident,
has been purchased a priori (i.e. sunk costs), and is a non-recurring
cost. We then evaluated if the addition of pandemic vaccines to the
treatment-only strategy provided a net cost benefit. Treatment is
assumed to be given to all influenza-like-illness cases, regardless of
vaccination. As oseltamivir treatment is optimal when adminis-
tered early within 48 hours [8,9], we assumed that only the
proportion of patients who are treated in a timely manner would
benefit from treatment.
Figure 1. Decision diagram for vaccination versus treatment only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007108.g001
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Input variables Age Ranges Sources
Demographic data 0–19 20–64 $65
Ave age 10 40 73 7
Population (thousand persons) 678.5 2,599 305.6 7
Low-risk 90% 89.7% 63.3%
High-risk{ 10% 10.3% 36.7% 5
Clinical data
Influenza clinical attack rate (%) 30 (10–50) 30 (10–50) 30 (10–50) 4,5,20
Mortality
Case fatality (per 100,000)1 MOHˆ
,5
Low-risk 5 (1–12.5) 6 (1–9) 340 (28–680)
High-risk 137 (12.6–765) 149 (10–570) 1700 (276–3400)
Earnings lost per death (USD$)" 936,319 873,046 91,865 MOMˆˆ
, [32]
Hospitalizations
Hospitalization rate (per 100,000 infected)# MOHˆ
Low-risk 210 (42– 525) 72 (12–108) 1634 (135–3268)
High-risk 210 (100 –1173) 234 (16–895) 2167 (352–4334)
Average Length Of Stay (days) 3.88 (2.3 –9.2) 4.61 (3.2–11.8) 6.2 (4.6–13.4) 4,5,20
Average Additional Days Lost 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) Local physicians
Hospital cost (USD$/day) 284 284 284 MOHˆ
Value of 1 lost day (USD$)* 55 84 55 MOMˆˆ
, [32]
Outpatient
Days lost from outpatient influenza 3 (1–5) 3 (1–5) 3 (1–5) 4,5,20
Consultation and treatment cost (USD$) 27 27 27 Local physicians
Value of 1 lost day(USD$)** 55 84 55 MOMˆˆ
, [32]
Treatment with oseltamivir
Sought early medical care (%) 70 (50–90) 70 (50–90) 70 (50–90) 5,20
Mortality reduction (%) 70 (50–90) 70 (50–90) 30 (20–90) 5,20
Hospital reduction (%) 60 (50–90) 60 (50–90) 30 (20–90) 5,20
Lost days gained (days) 1.0 (0.1–2.0) 1.0 (0.1–2.0) 1.0 (0.1–2.0) 5,20
Vaccination
Sought early vaccination (%) 70 (50–90) 70 (50–90) 70 (50–90) 4,5
Cost of vaccination, (USD$)
{{ 46.4 46.4 46.4 Estimated, 4, 10–12
% effective in preventing infection 60 (40–80) 60 (40–80) 0.48 (0.32–0.64) 10–18
Strain mismatch (%) 0 (0–100) 0 (0–100) 0 (0–100) Estimated
Economic Data
Mean Monthly Nominal Earnings 2007 USD$2,504 MOMˆˆ
Wage growth rate 2007 4.4% MOMˆˆ
Discount rate 3%
*Base case values are given with the range used for analysis given within the brackets ( ) where applicable. The input variables were modeled as triangular distributions
centered on the base values with the minimum and maximum values given by the extreme values in the ranges.
{All healthcare costs were converted to 2007 US dollars and were compounded using the consumer price index for Singapore
6.
{High risk includes asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases, heart, and diabetes patients.
ˆ
Ministry of Health, Singapore.
ˆˆ
Ministry of Manpower, Singapore.
1Based on mortality among those having clinical influenza.
"Average present value of future earnings lost per death of an individual of average age in the age group: using the 3% discount rate, of expected lifetime earnings and
housekeeping services, weighted by age and adjusted to 2007 SGD$ dollars (multiplying by a factor of 0.24) [9].
#The rate is based on hospitalizations among those having clinical influenza. The ranges are calculated based on a factor of the base cases versus the mortality rate.
**USD$84 for lost work day, USD$55 for unspecified days lost (taking care of ill child/elderly, and additional days lost post-hospitalization).
{{USD$20 per dose assuming 2 doses were required, and USD$7 for costs of administration and side effects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007108.t001
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As pandemic vaccination has hitherto not been deployed for the
actual prevention of a pandemic, its efficacy is largely unknown.
This study relied on current animal and human immunogenic
studies for H5N1 candidate vaccines to determine the possible
efficacies of a candidate pandemic vaccine [10–17]. Even though a
recent clinical trial found cross-reactivity to diverse H5N1 strains
[18], a future pandemic strain is unknown, and cross-reactivity will
vary between and among influenza subtypes [19]. To allow for
critical uncertainty in this key parameter, we have elected to
perform separate analysis at different vaccine effectiveness levels.
Vaccine cost, efficacy, and cross-reactivity (as mentioned above)
are 3 key variables. As a base-case scenario, we assumed the
vaccination cost of USD$46.4, i.e. based on higher-end pricing of
USD$19.9 per dose (assuming 2 doses were required compared to
USD$6.6 for one dose of seasonal vaccine), and USD$6.6 for costs
of administration and adverse effects similar to a previous study
[4]. We assumed that the safety of pandemic vaccines is similar to
seasonal influenza vaccination [10–12]. The other key variable of
efficacy against similar strains was considered, with the base
vaccine efficacy set at 60% (the elderly having lower efficacy) [4].
We assumed that vaccine efficacy was similar across reduction in
illness, hospitalization, and death as there is a lack of data
suggesting otherwise. We varied these parameters as a whole
rather than providing different stochastic variations which may be
unrealistic (e.g. low reduction in hospitalization but high reduction
in case-fatality). The third key variable was the likelihood that the
vaccine would not have cross-reactivity against the pandemic
strain (strain mismatch). The overall effectiveness of the vaccine
was measured as follows:
Overall effectiveness % ~Vaccine efficacy %
| 1 { Strain mismatch % ðÞ
We also assumed that everyone within a population (or selected
population sub-group) would be given the vaccine (i.e. stockpiling
and delivery costs for the entire population or population sub-
group), but that only the proportion that sought vaccination early
enough for sufficient antibody development would benefit.
Analysis
As pandemics are unpredictable with many uncertainties, we
have modeled all uncertain input variables (Table 1) as triangular
distributions centered on base values, with ranges based on the
minimum and maximum plausible values derived from previous
studies [4,5]. Analyses were performed based on the key outcomes
of overall cost-benefit, cost per life saved, and the annual insurance
premium.
Multiple stockpiling scenarios were analyzed to observe the costs
of different stockpile combinations. We explored scenarios where
the pandemic arrives within the first stockpile (akin to vaccination
for the current pandemic such as the H1N1-2009 without existing
stockpiles), and after 10, 30, and 50 years, and we assumed that the
stockpile would have a shelf-life of 3 and 5 years.
Sensitivity analyses were performed to identify variables that
have the largest influence on the outcome. In addition, one-way
sensitivity analyses were performed across several key variables
such as the efficacy and cost of the vaccine. Monte Carlo
simulation analyses were also performed to determine the key
outcomes under 1,000 scenarios each. We also explored key
outcomes by the 6 sub-groups to determine if pandemic vaccines
would be particularly beneficial in any population sub-group if
resources only allow for selected sub-groups to be vaccinated.
All costs were obtained and standardized to 2007 Singapore
dollars, and represented in United States dollars using the
following exchange rate (2007 exchange rate, USD$1:
SGD$1.507). The model was run using Excel spreadsheets
(Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA) and @Risk (Palisade, Newfield,
NY) simulation add-in. Details of the model and results are shown
in the Technical Supplement.
Results
If treatment-only strategy were adopted during a pandemic, the
mean number of simulated deaths in Singapore is 690 (5
th and 95
th
percentiles of 350 and 1,122), with 78% of deaths occurring in the
high-risk group. The mean number of hospital days is 13,950
(7,360, 23,445) with a total of 2.5 million workdays equivalent lost
(1.3 million, 4.1 million). The mean economic cost is USD$469.8
million (283.3 million, 1,303.9 million).
From the sensitivity analyses, the outcome was most sensitive to
the case-fatality rate, followed by the attack rate (Figure S1). The
key vaccine parameters of cost, efficacy, and strain mismatch also
had a substantial impact on the outcome.
If the vaccine was to be used for an impending pandemic (within
the first stockpile), the outcomes for a vaccine cost of USD$46.4,
based on different levels of vaccine efficacy and cross-reactivity,
are shown in Table 2. If the vaccine has a good match with the
pandemic strain, the cost-benefit of vaccination compared to
treatment only increased by USD$31.2 million (5
th and 95
th
percentiles – USD$18.6 million and USD$50.4 million) while the
number of deaths was reduced by 41 (21, 69) for every 10%
increase in vaccine efficacy. At vaccine efficacies of .55%,
vaccination was cost-beneficial over treatment-only. The mean
cost per life saved decreased with increasing vaccine efficacy, and
treatment-only was less beneficial than vaccination when the
vaccine efficacy exceeded 85%. However, the effectiveness
changes once strain mismatches (lack of cross-reactivity) are taken
into account. If the strain mismatch was 20%, vaccination was
cost-beneficial only at vaccine efficacies of .65%; if the mismatch
was 40%, vaccination was cost-beneficial at efficacies of .82%;
while vaccination was not cost-beneficial if the mismatch was
.50%.
If vaccines were stockpiled for a future pandemic, the outcomes
of the analyses are shown in Appendix S1. In the scenario where
the next pandemic occurred in 10 years and vaccine shelf-life was
5 years, it is evident that long term stockpiling of vaccines is not
cost-effective in the mean scenario even with 100% vaccine
efficacy and strain matching, and is only cost effective at the 5
th
percentile with 100% vaccines efficacy and up to 20% strain
mismatch.
Two-way sensitivity analyses were also conducted to determine
the annual insurance premiums of the different strategies under
different attack rates, case-fatality rates, and overall vaccine
effectiveness; these are the key epidemic parameters which
generate the greatest uncertainty in the outcome. Considering
the maximum annual insurance premium based on vaccine
stockpiling, the premium was higher with higher overall vaccine
effectiveness and attack rates (Table 3). For vaccination within the
first stockpile cycle, the assumed cost of vaccine of USD$46.4 is
less than the maximum insurance premium when the attack rate is
.38% at vaccine effectiveness of 40%; .25% at vaccine
effectiveness of 60%; and .18% at vaccine effectiveness of 80%,
suggesting that vaccination within the first stockpile cycle is cost-
beneficial under these conditions. If vaccination costs are reduced
Consider Pandemic Vaccination
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within the first stockpile cycle is almost always cost-effective. Even
under the lower cost of USD$6.6, long term stockpiling strategies
were cost-beneficial only with high vaccine effectiveness of .60%
or high attack rates of .40%.
At case-fatality rates of 0.1% [similar to inter-pandemic
epidemics [20–22]], most of the cost-benefit decisions favor
treatment-only over long-term stockpiling (Figure 2). With the
current influenza A (H1N1-2009) pandemic mortality of between
0.1 to 0.2% [23,24], immediate purchase and vaccination will
incur an insurance premium of between USD$25.9 to 30.6 for a
vaccine with 40% effectiveness, USD$39.5 to 46.5 with 60%
effectiveness, and USD$51.7 to 61.0 for a vaccine with 80%
effectiveness. At the USD$46.4 estimated cost, a vaccine with 80%
effectiveness would therefore be cost-effective.
For long term stockpiling strategies with 1957 and 1968
pandemic case-fatality rates of 0.4 to 0.6%, stockpiling would be
cost-beneficial only if the pandemic occurred within 10 years, the
shelf-life was 5 years, and vaccine effectiveness was .80%. As the
case-fatality increases, the maximal annual insurance premiums
match the USD$46.4 estimated costs at a wider range of
permutations. At a case-fatality of 5% [the higher end of the
1918 pandemic [25]], stockpiling would be cost-beneficial even at
probabilities of 50 years to the next pandemic if vaccine costs
could be reduced to seasonal levels.
The population sub-group analysis considered the annual
insurance premium when only a particular sub-group was
vaccinated (Table 4). Protection of the high-risk sub-groups
commanded a higher insurance premium compared to the low-
risk sub-groups. For the high-risk sub-groups, children command-
ed the highest premiums followed by adults and the elderly.
However, targeting the elderly resulted in the lowest cost per life
saved, as well as the most lives saved by vaccination compared to
treatment-only (Appendix S1).
Discussion
We have shown that pandemic vaccination is only cost effective
in severe pandemics, high vaccine effectiveness, and low vaccine
cost. The outcome of the model was very sensitive to the overall
vaccine effectiveness (a combination of vaccine efficacy and strain
matching); and the vaccine cost. Vaccine manufacturers and
policy-makers should be aware of the importance of these key
vaccine development parameters and the trade-off between
effectiveness and price, while noting that the economic outcomes
are different between countries and should be based on local data.
Vaccine efficacy may vary widely as shown by the efficacy of
existing H5N1 candidate vaccines against different H5N1 strains
[10–18]. The actual pandemic subtype could be different from
existing candidate vaccines, increasing the unpredictability. More
research is therefore required to develop candidate vaccines that
provide wider cross-reactivity and cross-protection, or to develop
vaccine libraries with multiple sub-types that can be quickly
produced when a novel influenza virus is detected.
Table 2. Costs and outcomes for with changes in vaccine efficacy and strain mismatch (shown for vaccination within first
stockpile)*{.
Cost benefit (millions USD$)
Strain mismatch
Vaccine Efficacy 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.2 103 (66, 128) 116 (87, 138) 126 (105, 142) 139 (124, 150) 151 (144, 157)
0.4 39 (235, 90) 65 (9, 109) 86 (44, 118) 111 (81, 134) 135 (121, 147)
0.6 224 (2136, 52) 14 (270, 80) 46 (217, 93) 83 (38, 118) 119 (98, 137)
0.8 288 (2237, 14) 237 (2149, 51) 5 (278, 69) 56 (24, 102) 104 (75, 127)
1.0 2152 (2338, 224) 288 (2228, 22) 235 (2139, 45) 28 (247, 86) 88 (52, 117)
Lives saved
Strain mismatch
Vaccine Efficacy 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.2 82 (41, 138) 64 (32, 108) 50 (25, 85) 33 (17, 54) 16 (8, 26)
0.4 165 (82, 277) 129 (63,215 0 101 (51, 171) 65 (33, 109) 32 (17, 53)
0.6 247 (123, 415) 193 (95, 323) 151 (76,256) 98 (50, 163) 48 (25, 79)
0.8 330 (165, 553) 258 (127,431) 201 (102, 341) 130 (66, 218) 65 (33,105)
1.0 412 (206, 692) 322 (158, 539) 252 (127, 426) 163 (83, 272) 81 (42, 132)
Cost per life saved (millions, USD$)
Strain m6ismatch
Vaccine Efficacy 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.2 1.78 (0.86, 3.19) 2.42 (1.16, 4.37) 3.24 (1.62, 5.81) 5.23 (2.72, 9.05) 10.94 (5.85, 18.72)
0.4 0.63 (0.17, 1.23) 0.94 (0.37, 1.81) 1.34 (0.60, 2.45) 2.31 (1.15, 4.09) 5.10 (2.69, 8.80)
0.6 0.24 (20.12, 0.64) 0.44 (0.04, 1.00) 0.71 (0.23, 1.41) 1.34 (0.60, 2.50) 3.15 (1.60, 5.52)
0.8 0.05 (20.29, 0.36) 0.2 (20.18, 0.61) 0.39 (0.01, 0.88) 0.85 (0.32, 1.71) 2.18 (1.08, 3.87)
1.0 20.06 (20.41, 0.21) 0.05 (20.32, 0.39) 0.20 (20.14, 0.58) 0.56 (0.12, 1.22) 1.59 (0.75, 2.85)
*Mean values are shown with 5
th and 95
th percentiles.
{All healthcare costs are in 2007 Singapore dollars.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007108.t002
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Impending pandemic
Vaccine effectiveness
Attack rate 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.1 6.02 (4.13, 8.33) 11.8 (8.03, 16.2) 17.9 (12.5, 24.3) 23.8 (16.4, 32.6)
0.3 18.1 (12.4, 25.0) 35.5 (24.1, 48.5) 53.8 (37.5, 72.7) 71.4 (49.3, 97.9)
0.5 30.1 (20.7, 41.7) 59.2 (40.2, 80.9) 89.6 (62.5, 121.2) 118.9 (82.2, 163.2)
Probability of pandemic occurring spread over 10 years
Vaccine effectiveness
Attack rate 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.1 0.60 (0.41, 0.83) 1.18 (0.80, 1.62) 1.79 (1.25, 2.42) 2.38 (1.64, 3.26)
0.3 1.81 (1.24, 2.50) 3.55 (2.41, 4.85) 5.37 (3.75, 7.27) 7.14 (4.93, 9.79)
0.5 3.01 (2.07, 4.16) 5.92 (4.02, 8.09) 8.96 (6.25, 12.1) 11.9 (8.22, 16.3)
Probability of pandemic occurring spread over 30 years
Vaccine effectiveness
Attack rate 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.1 0.20 (0.14, 0.28) 0.39 (0.27, 0.54) 0.60 (0.42, 0.81) 0.79 (0.55, 1.09)
0.3 0.60 (0.41, 0.83) 1.18 (0.80, 1.62) 1.79 (1.25, 2.42) 2.38 (1.64, 3.26)
0.5 1.00 (0.69, 1.39) 1.97 (1.34, 2.70) 2.99 (2.08, 4.04) 3.96 (2.74, 5.44)
Probability of pandemic occurring spread over 50 years
Vaccine effectiveness
Attack rate 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.1 0.123 (0.08, 0.17) 0.24 (0.16, 0.32) 0.36 (0.25, 0.48) 0.48 (0.33, 0.65)
0.3 0.36 (0.25, 0.50) 0.71 (0.48, 0.97) 1.07 (0.75, 1.45) 1.43 (0.99, 1.95)
0.5 0.60 (0.41, 0.83) 1.18 (0.80, 1.62) 1.79 (1.25, 2.42) 2.38 (1.64, 3.26)
*Mean values are shown with 5
th and 95
th percentiles.
{All healthcare costs are in 2007 US dollars (2007 exchange rate, USD$1: SGD$1.507).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007108.t003
Figure 2. Annual insurance premium for pandemic scenarios with changes in vaccine effectiveness and mortality rate*{. *Mean
values are shown with 5
th and 95
th percentiles. {All healthcare costs are in 2007 US dollars.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007108.g002
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in the first stockpile cycle (immediate vaccination) versus some
time during subsequent stockpile cycles will also have to be
considered. As evident from Table 3, in the case of long term
stockpiling wastage of earlier stockpiles occurs given the short
shelf-life of the vaccines, with the result being generally less cost-
beneficial, unless costs are reduced to seasonal vaccine levels or the
perception of severity is high. It may seem more cost-beneficial
when vaccines can be used within the first stockpile (purchasing
vaccines for vaccination only when a pandemic is impending)
which will also ensure the best strain match. The alternative
strategy, which avoids the costs and problems associated with long-
term stockpiling, is to await the appearance of a candidate
pandemic strain before accumulating a vaccine stock, with a view
to immediate vaccination once the vaccine stock becomes
available. This is reflected in the influenza A (H1N1-2009)
pandemic where there are no prior stockpiles and development of
vaccines are underway. A vaccine for immediate vaccination
against influenza A (H1N1-2009) with .80% effectiveness would
be cost-effective at case-fatality rates as low as 0.1–0.2%. However,
this strategy may be affected by the time required for vaccine
development and availability before the pandemic infects a
substantial proportion of the population, given the high global
demand [26]. Safety of such a new vaccine would also have to be
considered [27]. It may therefore be useful to develop low-cost
vaccines that provide good cross-protection and lasting-immunity
against a variety of influenza strains for long term stockpiling, of
perhaps consider vaccines with good cross-protection for seasonal
influenza vaccination programs.
Policy makers should consider funding research, development
and local production of vaccines using annual insurance premiums
as a guide to their willingness to pay for vaccine research and
purchases to prevent a potential catastrophe. If vaccine stockpiling
is to be considered, the cost of the vaccine is important. Other
factors which must be considered are the cross-reactivity of the
vaccine, context-specific political considerations (e.g. the value
placed on efficient management of crisis events), the potential
benefit of reducing surge demand for healthcare services through
vaccination, and the effect of rapid developments in vaccine
technology which may favor stockpiling, since with each stockpile
cycle progress in vaccine technology may make future vaccines
cheaper or more efficacious or both. For example, for an
impending pandemic occurring within the first stockpile cycle
(influenza A (H1N1-2009) pandemic), USD$61.0 may be spent
per capita to obtain a vaccine that has an overall effectiveness of
80% against a pandemic with 0.2% case-fatality. For Singapore,
this amount of .USD$199.1 million may be used for novel virus
vaccine development or purchase agreements. However, for future
pandemics, the premium decreases to USD$10.0 and USD$3.3 if
the pandemic is estimated to occur over the next 10 and 30 years
respectively. Development of cheaper and more effective vaccines
is therefore necessary for long-term stockpiling to be feasible.
At high attack and case-fatality rates with low vaccine efficacy,
the annual insurance premiums are much higher when compared
to high vaccine efficacy but with low attack and case-fatality rates.
If the perceived risk of disease severity is high (e.g. similar to the
1918 pandemic), the willingness to pay will be greater and even
long term stockpiling will be cost-beneficial. The decision to
purchase pandemic vaccines is therefore highly dependent on the
perception of disease severity.
It is also evident that high-risk subpopulations would benefit
most from vaccination due to the high number of lives saved.
High-risk children have high case-fatality rates and the highest
economic value from future earnings, and hence command the
highest annual insurance premiums. Similarly, high-risk elderly
showed the lowest cost per life saved due to the largest reduction in
deaths. Even if nation-wide vaccination or stockpiling are not
viable options; or if vaccines are insufficient for the entire
population, strategies which prioritize vaccination of high-risk
groups could be considered independently, with children and
adults favored for the highest economic effectiveness and elderly
favored for more overall lives saved. Finally, our analysis also
showed that the proportion who received early vaccination was
also important, and underscores the point that stockpiles must be
accompanied by well-planned programs to rapidly administer
vaccinations. The current Influenza A H1N1 2009 pandemic has
shown that additional high-risk sub-populations may be identified.
These have included pregnant women and obese individuals and
additional studies are required to determine the input and
outcome parameters for these sub-populations [28,29].
Table 4. Mean annual insurance premium for pandemic
scenarios with changes in vaccine effectiveness, by age and
risk groups*{.
Impending pandemic
Vaccine effectiveness 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Low risk - children 9.43 18.9 28.3 37.7
Low risk - adult 12.8 25.6 38.4 51.2
Low risk - elderly 14.8 29.6 44.4 59.2
High risk - children 67.4 134.7 202.1 269.5
High risk - adult 57.3 114.6 172 229.3
High risk - elderly 45.7 90.9 136.4 181.8
Probability of pandemic occurring spread over 10 years
Vaccine effectiveness 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Low risk - children 0.94 1.89 2.83 3.77
Low risk - adult 1.28 2.56 3.84 5.12
Low risk - elderly 1.48 2.96 4.44 5.92
High risk - children 6.74 13.47 20.21 26.95
High risk - adult 5.73 11.46 17.19 22.93
High risk - elderly 4.55 9.09 13.64 18.18
Probability of pandemic occurring spread over 30 years
Vaccine effectiveness 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Low risk - children 0.31 0.63 0.94 1.26
Low risk - adult 0.43 0.85 1.28 1.71
Low risk - elderly 0.49 0.99 1.48 1.97
High risk - children 2.25 4.49 6.74 8.98
High risk - adult 1.91 3.82 5.73 7.64
High risk - elderly 1.52 3.03 4.55 6.06
Probability of pandemic occurring spread over 50 years
Vaccine effectiveness 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Low risk - children 0.19 0.38 0.57 0.75
Low risk - adult 0.26 0.51 0.77 1.02
Low risk - elderly 0.30 0.59 0.89 1.18
High risk - children 1.35 2.69 4.04 5.39
High risk - adult 1.15 2.29 3.44 4.59
High risk - elderly 0.91 1.82 2.73 3.64
*Mean values are shown with 5
th and 95
th percentiles.
{All healthcare costs are in 2007 US dollars (2007 exchange rate, USD$1:
SGD$1.507).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007108.t004
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societal value of health – although cost-utility analyses could
address this, there are no available local indicators for Singapore.
In addition, we have not included the pandemic’s macro-economic
impact which would likely favor interventions to a greater degree.
While we have not considered recurring treatment stockpiles, any
additional treatment stockpile costs will be borne equally by both
strategies. For comparability, neither treatment nor vaccination
was assumed to alter the pandemic’s transmission dynamics.
Vaccination, in particular, may reduce total population attack
rates through increasing herd-immunity, but it is difficult to
predict the impact of an imperfect pandemic vaccine on the
transmission dynamics of a pandemic with characteristics that are
still not fully defined [30,31]. However, such immunity makes the
argument for a pandemic vaccine even more compelling. We also
did not consider long-term protection with immediate vaccination
as that is associated with uncertainties including technological
feasibility, waning immunity, and population turnover. Finally,
while these findings are focused on Singapore, we believe that it
provides a framework for other countries to consider analyzing in
their own setting, which is crucial to determining local economic
effectiveness.
Our study has shown that long-term vaccine stockpiling is
expensive and may not be cost-effective at the population level for
mild pandemics. However, stockpiling is cost-beneficial if
insurance against a severe pandemic is the main priority, if
specific high-risk groups are targeted, and if cheap and effective
vaccines are rapidly available through research and development
of novel vaccine technologies.
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